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This report tries to delve into the reasons 
why the nine EU members addressed here 
have chosen the positions that they have, 
and what Kosovo can do to engage with 
them more effectively. In doing so, two 
important and related points emerge. 
The first is that recognition, while im-
portant, is not everything. Engagement 
also matters. What is more important, 
a country that recognises Kosovo, but 
then has little to do with it, or a country 
that does not recognise it, but maintains 
active economic, political and social re-
lations? All too often the emphasis is on 
the former, rather than the latter. To be 
sure, recognition is important. Howev-
er, its value needs to be put in its proper 
context. Kosovo’s place in the world is 
more than about numbers in the United 
Nations, especially as the ongoing Russia 
veto is likely to keep it out of the UN for 
the foreseeable future. In the meantime, 
Kosovo needs to have meaningful inter-
action with the international community. 
What matters more for ordinary citizens: 
counting another win on a scoreboard, or 
gaining investment from a major compa-
ny from a non-recognising state.
Secondly, engagement is best thought of 
as a spectrum, rather than neat categories. 
Just consider the non-recognisers and en-
gagers. There are considerable differences 
in how Greece, Slovakia and Romania all 
interact with Kosovo. Moreover, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that countries can 
move along the spectrum. The position 
taken by a state today is not necessarily 
going to be the position it adopts tomor-
row. It can become more engaged, just as 
it can become less engaged. Rather than 
trying to move countries from non-rec-
ognition to recognition, Kosovo should 
also look at how it can encourage states 
towards greater engagement. In some cas-
es, it is about trying to encourage states 
to renew their engagement, or intensify 
it. Crucially, while this study considers 
the states of the EU, many of the lessons 
here are equally applicable to many other 
countries around the world.
IOANNIS ARMAKOLAS AND JAMES KER-LINDSAY
Introduction
Kosovo’s declaration of independence, 
in February 2008, resulted in a deep 
division within the European Union. 
While 23 members recognised Kosovo, 
five refused to accept its statehood. At 
the time, many observers expected the 
non-recognisers to fall into line eventu-
ally and accept Kosovo. However, in the 
decade since then, that has not happened. 
If anything, the picture has become more 
complex. Rather than two distinct camps, 
four broad groups now exist. First, there 
are the countries that have recognised 
Kosovo, and have forged meaningful re-
lations with it. These include Britain and 
Germany and most of the other members 
of the EU. At the other end of the scale 
there are the states that still refuse to 
recognise Kosovo, and continue to have 
very little to do with it. Spain and Cyprus 
fall into this category. However, between 
those two poles lie two other factions. 
Although Greece, Romania and Slovakia 
have refused to recognise Kosovo, they 
have nevertheless forged relatively good 
relations with Pristina. Meanwhile, the 
Czech Republic and Poland, while recog-
nising Kosovo, have in fact had relatively 
little diplomatic interaction with Kosovo 
authorities over the past ten years.
This report examines Kosovo’s relations 
with these four broad categories of states. 
In doing so, it shows that even within 
these groups – what we can roughly term 
‘recognisers and engagers’, ‘recognisers 
but non-engagers’, ‘non-recognisers 
but engagers’, and ‘non-recognisers and 
non-engagers’ - there are significant 
variations in how states behave. For ex-
ample, even those states that recognise 
Kosovo, and have done a lot to support it 
in the past, may now be far less engaged 
than they once were. Also, whereas some 
counties that have always been hostile to-
wards Kosovo have seen their positions 
harden, rather than soften, with the pas-
sage of time, others have gone the other 
way and become more willing to engage 
with Pristina. As is shown, the reasons 
for these changes in positions are com-
plex, and vary from country to country. 
In some cases, they reflect domestic po-
litical changes. In other cases, it is driv-
en by external policy concerns, such as 
a wish to be seen to be working closely 
with European partners. Also, the broader 
international political environment can 
play a part. For instance, events in Spain 
have made many countries warier about 
secession.
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Over the past twenty years, the Unit-ed Kingdom has been Kosovo’s single most important European ally in its 
attempts to gain recognition and acceptance 
on the international stage. Having been at 
the forefront of efforts to secure internation-
al intervention in 1999, from the very start of 
the status process the British Government 
left no doubt that it viewed statehood as the 
only viable outcome – a position that went 
almost entirely unchallenged domestically. 
Once Kosovo declared in independence, in 
February 2008, Britain, along with the Unit-
ed States, led the international efforts to try 
to persuade countries to recognize Kosovo 
and secure its place in various internation-
al organisations. This support saw Kosovo 
recognized by more than half the members 
of the United Nations and helped pave the 
way for Kosovo’s membership of many key 
international bodies, including the World 
Bank, International Monetary Fund and the 
International Olympic Committee. Britain 
also played a key role in supporting Kosovo 
during the International Court of Justice ad-
visory opinion proceedings on the legality of 
the declaration of independence. However, 
while Britain continues to support Kosovo, 
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be especially important when the country 
in question is a Commonwealth member.
Secondly, the domestic political situation in 
Kosovo in recent years has done enormous 
damage to recognition efforts. British offi-
cials express their frustration at the way in 
which Kosovo politicians have undermined 
efforts to secure further international ac-
ceptance. The disruption in the parliament, 
which saw opposition parties even resort 
to letting off tear gas, has been particularly 
harmful. The images were carried around 
the world. It was a public relations disas-
ter. As British officials noted, they could not 
say that it had proven that it was a stable, 
well-functioning democracy when images 
of demonstrations, public scuffles with po-
lice and MPs in gas masks were being carried 
by the international news media. Although 
the situation may now be improving, there 
is little doubt that the political instability 
of recent years has undermined Kosovo’s 
efforts to gain recognition, and has made 
it even harder for Kosovo’s supporters to 
make the case for more countries to accept 
its independent status.
Thirdly, after almost ten years since the dec-
laration of independence, and because they 
believe that Britain can no longer take the 
central role in trying to persuade others to 
recognize Kosovo, British officials believe 
that it is vital for Kosovo to be seen to be 
taking the lead in future. Again, this is not 
to say that Britain is no longer prepared to 
play a role in trying to persuade others to 
recognize Kosovo, or secure Kosovo’s mem-
bership in international organizations. It 
will when it sees an opportunity. Instead, 
the British Government wants to move to-
wards playing a more supportive role. Koso-
vo needs to be getting out and taking charge 
of such activities.
Finally, all these factors are playing out in 
a rapidly changing international environ-
ment. Whereas Kosovo was once high on 
the British foreign policy agenda, the loom-
ing prospect of Britain’s departure from the 
European Union raises important questions 
about the future direction of British exter-
nal relations. London’s focus on Kosovo, or 
even the wider Balkan region, is likely to 
diminish. Notwithstanding the high-pro-
file success of major singing stars, such as 
Rita Ora and Dua Lipa, Britain does not have 
strong ties to Kosovo. According to the last 
census, in 2011, the number of people born 
in Kosovo living in Britain was 28,000. This 
is tiny, especially in relative terms. For in-
stance, there are almost 600,000 Poles in 
the country. Also, the economic relation-
ship is minimal. Latest figures show that 
Kosovo was ranked 177th as a source of im-
ports, and 179th as an export destination. 
As the main centre of British attention will 
need to be on building up trade ties with 
the world’s largest economies, such as the 
United States and China, or with countries 
and presses for recognition whenever suit-
able opportunities arise, there is no doubt 
that the intensity of its lobbying activity has 
decreased in recent years. This is due to sev-
eral clearly identifiable factors.
First, the task of securing more recogni-
tions has now become extremely difficult. 
As one British official noted, ‘the low hang-
ing fruit has been picked’. Those countries 
that were in any way inclined to recognize 
Kosovo did so long ago. The remaining 80 
or so United Nations members that have not 
recognized Kosovo are, by and large, the 
tougher hold outs. As Britain sees it, these 
states fall into four broad categories. The 
first are states that have a deep aversion to 
secession and still regard Kosovo as a dan-
gerous precedent. Recent developments 
with Kurdistan and Catalonia will only have 
hardened the resistance of such countries 
towards recognition. Then there are those 
states oppose Kosovo’s independence on 
ideological grounds. These include Russia 
and Iran, which view Kosovo as a ‘Western 
project’. The next group are those countries 
that would rather hold off until some sort of 
final settlement is reached between Serbia 
and Kosovo. Finally, and perhaps most im-
portantly for Kosovo, there are what may be 
called ‘the inertia states’. These are coun-
tries that have not recognized because the 
wheels of their politics and diplomacy turn 
at a different pace. Many countries, espe-
cially those in further flung corners of the 
world, know little about Kosovo, and care 
even less. It is not that they do not want 
to recognize Kosovo. They simply do not 
prioritize it. In cases where recognition 
requires parliamentary approval, Kosovo 
may simply be a victim of far other, more 
pressing, concerns. 
Apart from the ‘inertia states’, persuading 
the other countries to recognize Kosovo is 
now incredibly difficult, if not futile. There 
is a sense in British official circles that the 
amount of diplomatic effort expended to 
try to encourage these hold outs is just not 
worth it any longer. Indeed, active efforts 
could in fact be harmful to Britain’s inter-
national standing. After a sustained effort 
to persuade countries to recognize Kosovo, 
the impression that London is continuing to 
press countries to do so, and is now simply 
being ignored, damages Britain’s prestige. 
Importantly, this view appears to be shared 
more widely. Other members of the Quint 
– the five Western Countries tasked with 
overseeing Kosovo’s transition to its final 
status – have apparently made the same 
observation. As one diplomat was report-
ed to have told the other members of the 
group, the failure to attract further recogni-
tions was “becoming embarrassing”. Again, 
this is not to say that the situation cannot 
change under certain circumstances. For 
example, if a country is signaling that it may 
be open to recognizing Kosovo, then Britain 
would be willing to assist. Such support can 
16
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Germany’s growing role in European and international affairs has made it one of the most prominent actors 
in the Western Balkans. Due to the dimin-
ishing attention from the United States, 
and because of the United Kingdom’s loss 
of influence because of Brexit, Germany’s 
regional role may continue to grow. This 
has developed into German leadership on 
the Kosovo-Serbia relations and on prepar-
ing the region for EU accession through the 
Berlin Process. For Germany, supporting 
Kosovan statehood is part of the strategy to 
build stability in the Western Balkans and 
the wider integration process. It has consis-
tently supported Kosovo’s statehood since 
Kosovo declared independence in 2008. It 
has been active in gaining more bilateral 
recognitions and memberships in interna-
tional organisations for Kosovo. German 
politicians openly pressure Serbia to make 
progress on normalisation. Within the Eu-
ropean Union, Germany works closely with 
the five non-recognisers to allow Kosovo to 
have a European perspective.
Germany was part of the main international 
negotiations on Kosovo since the 1990s. Al-
02
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where it has close historic ties, such as the 
Commonwealth states, the amount of dip-
lomatic attention that will be devoted to 
Kosovo, or even the wider Western Balkans, 
is likely to decline. Of course, many British 
officials recognize that Kosovo remains an 
important security concern. However, even 
on this issue, Kosovo is not ranked partic-
ularly highly in global terms. Also, some 
argue that the European Union should be 
taking a greater role in this area.
Overall, Britain remains a solid supporter 
of Kosovo’s independence. However, its de-
sire to actively lobby countries to recognize 
Kosovo, or help Kosovo join international 
organizations, has undoubtedly dimin-
ished in recent years. As the success rate 
has dropped, British policy makers have 
come to believe that over-vigorous lobby-
ing reduces the United Kingdom’s standing. 
Looking ahead, it is unlikely that this will 
change. Apart from anything else, Britain is 
going to be too focused on Brexit to take an 
active role on lobbying for Kosovo’s recog-
nition in the way that it once did. However, 
this is not to say that it is will be unwilling to 
help. It will do so when and where it can. To 
this end, the Kosovo Government must take 
the lead on future recognition activities. It 
must show that it has a coherent plan of 
action, perhaps focused on those countries 
where recognition is being held up by slow 
political processes, and then indicate where 
it feels that Britain can help. Perhaps even 
more importantly, Kosovo has got to pro-
vide its supporters with the best possible 
case to persuade non-recognizers that it is 
a stable and democratic society that should 
be accepted as a universally recognised 
member of the international community.
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ing states, for example it was the first forum 
in which Kosovo’s flag was displayed along 
that of other Western Balkans states.  
To gain more international recognitions, 
Germany coordinated with the Kosovan 
government and key allies such as the USA 
and EU members. However, so as not to 
alienate Russia further it focussed first on 
Europe. Later it turned to countries which 
had neither a strong position for or against 
an independent Kosovo. For this Germa-
ny has integrated the question of Kosovo 
statehood into bilateral meetings when 
possible. Since the initial wave of bilater-
al recognitions has passed, Germany has 
been involved in working closely with the 
Kosovan leadership on pursuing Kosovo’s 
membership in international organisations. 
These have included larger international 
organisations, as well as social and sports 
institutions. As Germany is a strong regional 
leader, and often one of the largest financial 
contributors in multilateral organisations, it 
has therefore been able to mobilise support. 
Germany remains committed to supporting 
Kosovo in gaining more recognitions and 
joining international organisations. How-
ever, the reality of the decreasing number 
of potential new recognising states and the 
slow progress on the Belgrade-Pristina dia-
logue make these lobby efforts more diffi-
cult. In this context, the role of the Kosovan 
leadership becomes ever more important 
now as much of the future of the recogni-
tion process and particularly the accession 
to international organisation depends on 
an effective strategy by the Kosovan gov-
ernment. Regardoing the recent difficul-
ties in gaining membership at UNESCO 
and Interpol, German policy makers point 
at international circumstances but also at 
miscalculations from of the Kosovan gov-
ernment. In the case of UNESCO, in the 
view of German policy makers, Kosovo had 
not fulfilled the protection of cultural heri-
tage sites and was therefore applying from 
a weak position. Kosovo’s initial decision to 
put a bid forward regardless was a surprise. 
The limited time and capacity due to the 
coalition negotiations made the necessary 
lobbying efforts impossible. Future UNE-
SCO membership may also be made more 
difficult by the United States leaving the 
organisation and therefore Kosovo losing 
its strongest supporter. The difficulty in the 
case of Interpol was, according to German 
policy makers, mostly due to the role of the 
People’s Republic of China, a non-recognis-
er, as the host country. Due to the inability 
for Kosovans to travel to China and engage 
in lobby work there was no realistic oppor-
tunity to engage with member states and 
not much Kosovan partner could do. The 
hope for German policy makers is that at 
the next annual general meeting in Dubai, 
UAE, a recognising state and supporter of 
Kosovo, the Kosovan government have 
sufficient time to lobby successfully for 
though its role was limited in the early stag-
es it developed into an important actor, con-
sidered able to build bridges with Serbia and 
Russia. The participation in NATO’s inter-
vention of 1999 was a controversial decision 
domestically but Germany still provides the 
largest European contingent to KFOR. Ger-
many also laid the foundations for European 
integration for the Western Balkan region by 
initiating the Stability Pact for South-East-
ern Europe in 1999. Along with Italy, Ger-
many was critical of the Ahtisaari process 
as it failed to take Serbian considerations 
on board and alienated the leadership in 
Belgrade. When an extension of the status 
negotiations was agreed, a German diplo-
mat, Wolfgang Ischinger, represented the 
EU and chaired the Troika with the USA and 
Russia. Those final Troika negotiations also 
failed to reach an agreement. Nevertheless, 
because of the chairman’s engagement with 
several EU members, Kosovo gained more 
EU recognitions and the five non-recognis-
ing members agreed to find a compromise 
to deploy the EULEX mission on a ‘status 
neutral’ mandate. Germany was therefore 
instrumental in reaching high recognition 
numbers in the EU and to secure the role 
of the EU in Kosovo despite disagreement 
on the status among EU member states. 
Hesitations among German political par-
ties were also overcome through the Troika 
negotiations and after recognition Germany 
became the most publicly outspoken cham-
pion of Kosovan statehood.
Since 2008, Germany has had several coa-
lition governments under the leadership of 
Chancellor Merkel but the position on Koso-
van statehood has remained consistent. In 
response to the Serbian request for an Ad-
visory Opinion by the International Court 
of Justice, Germany coordinated the con-
tributions of the recognising EU members 
to ensure the best possible representation 
in favour of Kosovo. Following the Court’s 
decision German politicians became more 
outspoken in support of Kosovan indepen-
dence. In 2011 Chancellor Merkel was the 
only foreign leader to publicly call for the 
dismantling of Serbian parallel structures in 
northern Kosovo. In 2012 German Members 
of Parliament of the CDU went to Belgrade 
and suggested that Germany would not al-
low for progress on Serbian EU accession 
status if it did not recognise Kosovo. This 
pressure by some German parliamentarians 
has continued over the years, although it is 
not official government policy. Relations 
with Serbia deteriorated and Germany posi-
tioned itself as a tough broker in support for 
Kosovan statehood but also key to Serbia’s 
EU accession. Although relations improved 
under Prime Minister/President Vučić, Ger-
many insists on continuing to discuss prog-
ress on normalisation as part of Serbian EU 
accession talks and wants Serbia to open 
chapter 35 of the acquis, on the future rela-
tions with Kosovo, as soon as possible. With-
in the Berlin Process Germany established 
Kosovo as an equal partner to it neighbour-
20
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membership and to coordinate closely with 
partners.
 From a German perspective, Kosovo’s so-
cio-political and economic development is 
directly related to increasing recognitions 
and membership in international organisa-
tions. Kosovo needs to become more attrac-
tive as an international partner by delivering 
on the promised reforms. Related to this are, 
in the eyes of German policy makers, wider 
issues of EU integration such as progress on 
demarcation of the border with Montenegro 
and fighting organised crime are immediate 
priorities to reach visa liberalisation. Final-
ly, the normalisation of relations between 
Kosovo and Serbia is an essential aspect of 
this. If relations with Serbia improve, rec-
ognising Kosovo appears less as a hostile or 
risky act to third countries.
Due to its growing role in the European 
Union, Germany is the key ally for Kosovo 
in the European Union. Germany has also 
been an active advocate for Kosovan inde-
pendence and recognition over the past ten 
years. For Germany, Kosovo’s full statehood 
is directly related to stability in the West-
ern Balkans and is one aspect of its regional 
integration strategy. Germany is spending 
significant political capital on keeping EU 
members cooperative despite their dis-
agreement on Kosovo’s status and lack of 
interest in enlargement. Due to this there is 
also a strong focus on political reforms and 
Germany is unlikely to let any EU candidate 
country in the region cut corners before 
joining the union. As much pressure as Ger-
many may put on Serbia to remain engaged 
and constructive on Kosovo, it will continue 
to be stringent on conditionality for Kosovo, 
for example on visa liberalisation. Regard-
ing its international strategy towards greater 
recognition, Kosovo will be able to count on 
German support. The Kosovan government 
needs to provide a clear and consistent strat-
egy that assesses risks before issuing a bid. 
The case of UNESCO has, in the eyes of Ger-
man policy makers, damaged the Kosovan 
‘brand’ and its prospects for membership 
in other organisations. Close coordination 
with members of organisations who can act 
as sponsors is essential as well as allowing 
sufficient time. This should likely result in 
a successful bid for Interpol in 2018. Bilater-
al full recognitions are unlikely to increase 
significantly in the short-term, and Serbia 
continues with its anti-recognition cam-
paign. Kosovo needs to present itself as a 
viable and attractive partner to encourage 
engagement on economic and social level 
with new partners, even if it is not able to 
achieve full diplomatic recognition.
The Czech Republic’s relations with independent Kosovo have been very complicated, but they have a 
great potential for improvement. For out-
side observers, the situation is difficult to 
understand. Although the Czech govern-
ment recognised Kosovo’s independence 
at the end of May 2008, President Václav 
Klaus disagreed with the decision and re-
fused to appoint a Czech Ambassador in 
Pristina. Foreign Minister Schwarzenberg, 
however, went against the president’s opin-
ion and ensured his ministry established 
diplomatic relations with the Republic of 
Kosovo by transforming the Czech UNMIK 
Liaison Office in Pristina into the Embassy 
of the Czech Republic. Schwarzenberg also 
appointed a chargés d’affaires to lead the 
embassy. While this would seem an unusual 
situation, it is far from unique. This kind 
of contradiction seems to be a ‘signature 
move’ in Czech foreign policy towards in-
dependent Kosovo. What made this com-
bination of recognition and disengagement 
possible? Understanding the sources of this 
contradiction is a crucial precondition for 
thinking about improving the Czech-Koso-
vo relations in the future. 
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On the one hand, it is important to under-
stand that the Czech people feel a cultural 
closeness with the Slavic peoples in the Bal-
kans and that there is a long-term special re-
lationship with the Serb nation that can be 
traced back to the pan-Slavic movement in 
the 19th century. In contrast, until the 1990s, 
there had been nearly no significant links 
between the Czech and (Kosovo)Albanian 
cultural, political, and economic spheres. 
Albanians, if anything, had been negatively 
associated with the ‘Ottomans’, ‘Turks’, or 
‘Mohammedans’. In this context, they were 
viewed as the symbolic oppressors of Slavs 
and Christians in Southeast Europe. In 1993, 
Kosovo was mentioned in the Czech Parlia-
ment as another potential ‘security problem’ 
in Southeast Europe, and Albanians as a ‘mil-
itant nation’. 
On the other hand, it is also crucial to consid-
er that after the fall of the communist regime 
in 1989, the Czech Republic geopolitically 
transitioned from the East to the West and 
its governments usually aligned the Czech 
foreign policy with one of the major Western 
liberal-democratic countries. These coun-
tries have been the principal international 
architects of Kosovo’s independence, and 
they exerted considerable influence on other 
countries, including the Czech Republic, to 
recognise Kosovo as an independent state. 
The contradiction in the Czech relationship 
with Kosovo has been embedded precisely 
in the combination of the pro-Serb national 
sentiment and the pro-Western geopolitical 
orientation. Accordingly, many Czech pol-
iticians tended to favour the Serb national 
cause, but they retreated from their pro-
Serb positions once confronted with their 
Western allies. For example, in 2013, when 
Miloš Zeman became the President of the 
Czech Republic, he stuck to Klaus’ policy 
of disengagement and refused to take the 
Czech-Kosovo diplomatic relations to an am-
bassadorial level. And yet, in 1999, it was the 
government of the same Miloš Zeman that 
succumbed to the Western pressure and 
approved the NATO air strikes. A similar 
combination of the Czech pro-Serb bias and 
international pressures lay behind the Czech 
government’s decision to recognise Kosovo. 
In fact, the first attempt to recognise Kosovo 
failed when the Christian Democratic Party 
openly questioned the legal status of Koso-
vo’s independence. In the end, the govern-
ment recognised Kosovo in a special session 
in the town of Teplice, without prior notice. 
Even then, out of a cabinet of 18 members, 
only 11 ministers favoured the decision.
Thus, the contradiction in the Czech rela-
tionship with Kosovo has been contingent 
upon the combination of the pro-Serb do-
mestic bias and the Western influence upon 
the Czech foreign policy. Interestingly, 
though, this contradiction has not corre-
sponded with any other major ideological, 
political, or geopolitical cleavages in the 
Czech politics. In real terms, it has, howev-
er, led to the establishment of two relatively 
stable groups of actors, whose relations with 
independent Kosovo have been highly con-
tradictory. Initially, the pro-Western camp 
was led by Václav Havel, who was President 
of Czechoslovakia and then President of 
the Czech Republic between 1989 and 2003. 
Later on, this approach to Kosovo was rep-
resented mainly by Karel Schwarzenberg, 
who worked with Havel, and then served 
as the Czech Foreign Minister in 2007-2009 
and 2010-2013. The pro-Western day-to-
day agenda has been carried out mainly by 
the Czech foreign service, which has been 
steadily pro-Western in its approach to 
Kosovo, and remains so. Meanwhile, the 
pro-Serb group of Czech actors was initially 
represented chiefly by Václav Klaus, Havel’s 
political rival who held several high-profile 
political positions (Czech Prime Minister in 
1992-1998, Speaker of the Chamber of Dep-
uties in 1998-2002, and Czech President in 
2003-2013). However, this camp involved 
or still involves many other senior political 
figures hailing from various political parties, 
such as Jiří Dientsbier (Foreign Minister of 
Czechoslovakia in 1989-1992), Jan Kavan 
(Czech Foreign Minister in 1998-2000, So-
cial Democratic Party), Lubomír Zaorálek 
(Foreign Minister in 2014-2017, Social Demo-
cratic Party), Jaroslav Foldyna (MP for Social 
Democratic Party since 2010), Vojtěch Filip 
(Chairman of the Czech Communist Party 
since 2005), and many others. Importantly, 
and in line with the fact that the splits do 
not correspond to established cleavages in 
Czech politics, many of the pro-Serb actors 
have been otherwise staunchly pro-Western. 
From Kosovo’s perspective, it may seem 
that the Western influence on the Czech 
foreign policy has been beneficial and that 
the pro-Western approach to Kosovo should 
be further strengthened and developed. 
However, it is important to realise that the 
Czech government’s recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence was perhaps the last and final 
significant achievement of the pro-Western 
approach to Kosovo. The process that led up 
to the Czech recognition of Kosovo’s inde-
pendence united the pro-Serbian political 
actors from different segments of the Czech 
political scene. These actors then worked 
to spoil closer engagement with Kosovo as 
a sovereign country. The potential of the 
pro-Western approach to Kosovo may, there-
fore, have been already exhausted. As things 
stand, Kosovo’s Western supporters do not 
have any instruments to enhance social, po-
litical, or economic engagement between the 
Czech Republic and the Republic of Kosovo.
The one thing the two camps share in com-
mon is that neither shares an authentic ap-
preciation of Kosovo, as such. Czech foreign 
policy actors approved the NATO airstrikes 
and recognised Kosovo’s independence 
primarily because of the partners in the 
West, not because of the consideration of 
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the situation in Kosovo itself.  In light of the 
above, it appears that, with the exception of 
the diplomatic service, the current Czech 
relationship with Kosovo is nearly void of 
genuine engagement with the country and 
its people. Worryingly, it would seem that 
Kosovo’s engagement with the Czech Repub-
lic suffers from the same problem, but even 
stronger. For instance, the Kosovo embassy 
in Prague does not produce any Czech con-
tent or English content customised for the 
Czech context. This shortcoming means that 
Czech politicians or journalists cannot start 
representing Kosovo more strongly, even if 
they wished to do so. For the sake of compar-
ison, the Czech embassy in Pristina usually 
posts several contributions in the Albanian 
language per week. Another problem Czech 
officials mention is that their Kosovar coun-
terparts tend to focus only on the issues of 
recognition and international status. Accord-
ing to Czech officials, this one-dimensional 
approach often jeopardised the success of 
other initiatives. 
Overall, there is a contradiction between the 
pro-Western and pro-Serb approaches that 
defines the current Czech relationship with 
Kosovo. At the same time, Kosovo seems to 
be only interested in matters concerning in-
ternational diplomacy and recognition. As 
things stand, there are rather unfavourable 
conditions for engagement and cooperation 
in the future. To create more openings for 
mutually enriching interaction between 
the two countries, Kosovo needs to look 
beyond a policy that focuses solely on deal-
ing with the issues of international status. 
It is crucial that Kosovo develops an ability 
to produce original content customised for 
the Czech context and that it starts engaging 
with broader audiences beyond the confines 
of the Czech foreign service. In this regard, 
Kosovo could even use the Czech pro-Serb 
bias to its advantage. For example, one move 
that could have an impact would be to ap-
point a Kosovo Serb as the next ambassador 
to Prague. Furthermore, Kosovo could use 
the issues of common interest, such as the 
process of EU enlargement, to engage more 
with political actors in the Czech Repub-
lic. Finally, Kosovo diplomats and officials 
should prepare their political and public po-
sitions on why is it important that the Czech 
Republic and Kosovo move to a new level of 
engagement. This is critical because we can 
expect that in the new political set-up fol-
lowing the October 2017 general elections, 
and the January 2018 presidential elections, 
the relations with Kosovo can, once again, 
become issues of high public and political 
contention. Kosovo representatives should 
be ready to publicly make the case for Koso-
vo when the situation demands it. 
PoPoland’s policy towards South East-ern Europe focuses on two areas: EU enlargement and security. Both 
in fact converge. EU accession for Western 
Balkan Six (WB6) is seen, from a strategic, 
long-term perspective, to increase the secu-
rity of the whole continent. Still, the region 
is not a priority area for Polish foreign policy. 
Also, relations with individual SEE countries 
are not prioritised in an equal manner. The 
most important partner for Poland, from 
among all the WB6 countries, is Serbia. This 
has a significant impact on the way Warsaw 
approaches relations with Pristina. 
Poland was not an enthusiastic supporter of 
Kosovo’s independence, even though rec-
ognition came on 26 February 2008, a week 
after the formal declaration. The Council 
of Ministers explored four options, recom-
mended by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 
(1) immediate recognition; (2) no recogni-
tion; (3) waiting to see how the situation 
develops and then recognise; (4) recognise 
but not establish diplomatic relations. Ini-
tially, the government – a coalition of Civic 
Platform and the Peasants Party – wanted to 
be among the first recognisers (reportedly 
under heavy pressure from Washington). 
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There was, however, a direct and open op-
position from the presidential palace. The 
President of Poland was worried what im-
pact this recognition would have on the fu-
ture of separatist provinces in the former So-
viet Union, notably Abkhazia, South Ossetia 
and Transnistria. An important context for 
this discord was a personal conflict between 
Prime Minister Donald Tusk and Minister 
of Foreign Affairs Radoslaw Sikorski on one 
side, and President Lech Kaczynski on the 
other; both Tusk and Sikorski were strong 
supporters of Kosovo’s independence. Con-
stitutionally, the government needed a pres-
idential sign off on the decision. The final 
solution was, therefore, a result of a com-
promise, acceptable to the President – rec-
ognition, but no direct diplomatic relations. 
It is worth noting that Polish policy towards 
Kosovo did not have a negative impact on its 
bilateral relations with Serbia.
This dichotomy of views prevailed over 
the next nine years, impacting Polish – 
Kosovar ties. There are at least two exam-
ples of Poland’s inconsistent approach to-
wards Kosovo – the debate over opening a 
Trade Office/Embassy and abstention from 
the vote over Kosovo’s UNESCO bid. In 
the period between mid-2010, when Civic 
Platform’s Bronisław Komorowski became 
Polish President, and late 2014, when Don-
ald Tusk left the post of the Prime Minister 
to become the President of the European 
Council, the government debated revers-
ing its original decision and establishing 
direct diplomatic relations. Reportedly 
this topic was discussed by the Council of 
Ministers at least twice, each time failing 
to find a ‘convenient moment’ (e.g. region-
al visit by the President). The idea was 
abandoned when Ewa Kopacz replaced 
Tusk as the PM. The second instance was 
Kosovo’s UNESCO bid, and Poland’s ab-
stention. Poland based its final position 
on three premises: Kosovo’s membership 
in UNESCO could disrupt the dialogue be-
tween Belgrade and Pristina; UNESCO was 
facing important decisions regarding its 
future activities and financing, and Koso-
vo’s membership would politicise its work; 
The 2011 Palestinian bid was a vital sign-
post, back them Poland abstained from 
voting. Still, Poland maintained that it re-
mains a firm supporter of Kosovo’s state-
hood, and that abstention in the vote had 
no impact on it whatsoever.
In practical terms, the lack of direct diplo-
matic ties meant that cooperation between 
Poland and Kosovo mainly took place in 
multilateral fora; bilateral work remained 
low key (e.g. regular consultations of MFA’s 
at the level of Directors). Still, Poland main-
tained its direct presence and support for 
Kosovo. For example, there has been a Pol-
ish Military Contingent in Kosovo within 
KFOR since 1999, currently stationing in 
Novo Selo. Also, a Polish Police Special Unit 
operates in Mitrovica.
Since 2015, the foreign policy approach of the 
new Law and Justice government has been 
observably different than its predecessors. 
Close alignment with Germany, character-
istic during the previous eight years, was to 
a large extent abandoned. Instead, the focus 
was on closer regional cooperation – primari-
ly within the Visegrad Group, or V4. Initially, 
there was an ambitious political agenda to 
focus on the North-South axis, which would 
have increased Poland’s presence in South 
Eastern Europe (closer cooperation with 
Albania, Croatia, Serbia, more significant 
support for Bosnia and Herzegovina, with 
Kosovo mostly absent from these debates). 
But an escalation of events in Ukraine since 
the 2014 Euromaidan has stopped that. Poli-
ticians have not however wholly abandoned 
those ideas, as, for example, the 2017 Three 
Seas Initiative summit – aimed at regional co-
operation of countries between the Adriatic, 
Baltic and Black seas – has shown.
Currently, the establishment of direct diplo-
matic relations between Poland and Kosovo 
is out of the question and is not on the table, 
despite the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ sup-
port for such a step. There are three identifi-
able reasons for that. Firstly, current political 
elites follow a cautious approach of the late 
president Kaczynski, and there is no sign 
of a willingness to change the status quo. 
Secondly, there is an observable influence 
of nationalist, pro-Slavic faction within the 
ruling elites. And thirdly there are no firm 
advocates for a change of the status quo, ei-
ther within or outside of Poland (unlike in 
2008).
Today’s Polish policy towards Kosovo falls 
within a broader regional approach. Support 
for the EU enlargement remains a priority. 
Warsaw’s initiatives towards the region are 
limited in scope, with a multilateral ap-
proach, primarily via the Visegrad Group, be-
ing the preferred option. Concerning direct, 
bilateral relations, Poland tends to prioritise 
two capitals – Belgrade and Tirana (with Al-
bania being a strong advocate of Kosovo’s 
agenda). More generally, Poland sees itself 
as a bridge between the old and the new EU 
member states and is an active member of 
the ‘friends of enlargement’ group within 
the EU. The country wants to use its expe-
rience of successful democratic transition 
from communism and subsequent EU ac-
cession and promote them, although this is 
more prominent in the case of the Eastern 
Partnership countries, and less so in South 
East Europe. This involvement varies in 
degree and level, ranging from small-scale 
projects, such as the Enlargement Acade-
my, a training programme for civil servants, 
through to major multilateral events, such 
as the summit of ministers of foreign affairs 
from the V4 and Western Balkans hosted in 
Warsaw in November 2016. In terms of civil 
society engagement, cooperation exists but 
receives limited state support. Recognition 
without a diplomatic presence creates a 
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legal quagmire for the use of public funds. 
Support therefore relies mainly on Europe-
an funds, such as Erasmus Plus for NGOs, 
Erasmus Mundus Action 2 for academics, 
or focuses on humanitarian assistance. 
Despite the approach so far, Poland’s interest 
in Kosovo is set to increase. One can identify 
three factors facilitating this change. First, 
Poland is deeply worried by the malign in-
fluence of external actors – especially Russia 
– in South Eastern Europe. It sees them as 
a threat to a ‘fragile stability’ of the whole 
region. Polish diplomats point out Russian 
influences in Serbia; the attempted coup in 
Montenegro; and the separatist rhetoric of 
Milorad Dodik in Republika Srpska, linked 
with his visits to Moscow. Closer attention 
paid by Poland to Russian actions in SEE is 
a consequence of the events in Ukraine af-
ter Euromaidan. Poland is one of the most 
active proponents of an establishment of a 
South East European Strategic Communi-
cations Task Force, which would mirror the 
work of the currently existing East StratCom 
Task Force focusing on the Eastern Partner-
ship countries. Although Poland prioritises 
Russian threat, it also looks at the actions of 
other external actors in the region – China, 
Turkey, the Gulf countries, and non-state ac-
tors (especially extremist groups). Secondly, 
security concerns about SEE have accelerat-
ed since 2015; primarily due to the migration 
crisis. Poland calls for closer cooperation 
with SEE to tackle the challenges posed by 
terrorism, jihadism, hybrid warfare, people’s 
smuggling, radicalisation, the flow of foreign 
fighters, funding of terrorism and organised 
crime. Thirdly, and most importantly, Poland 
is set to become a non-permanent member 
of the UN Security Council (2018 – 19). While 
the situation in Ukraine will undoubtedly be 
a priority for Warsaw, Kosovo may be given 
more consideration. Although, as explained 
earlier, Kosovo is not the most important re-
gional partner for Poland in South Eastern 
Europe, United Nations may become a new 
platform for cooperation, going beyond the 
EU enlargement agenda. 
For the past nine years, Warsaw has ap-
proached Kosovo as an aspect of Poland’s 
relations with the EU and the US. However, 
changes in Polish foreign policy (post-2015), 
combined with the growing perception of 
threat from Russia, have led to a re-eval-
uation of Polish policy towards the whole 
region. Poland’s membership in the UNSC 
provides an opportunity to intensify bilat-
eral relations between Warsaw and Pristina 
although with the caveat that establishment 
of direct diplomatic relations between both 
countries remains unlikely.
Greece is the non-recogniser with by far the biggest political and economic interests in the West-
ern Balkans, a key player when it comes 
to EU’s enlargement policy in the region, 
and a country with close, but often turbu-
lent, relations with Albania. Greece is also 
a country that maintains its non-recogni-
tion stance, while at the same time offer-
ing glimpses of hope to Kosovars due to its 
strong policy of engagement with Pristina. 
The background to its position on Kosovo 
status is Greece’s Balkan policy. Back in the 
early 1990s, swept by a nationalist wave 
over the Macedonian question and the Yu-
goslav wars, Greece found itself in dispute 
with all its neighbours and in amicable re-
lations only with Milosevic’s Serbia. This, 
coupled with heightened anti-Western sen-
timent, brought Greece at odds with all its 
Western partners. Changing gear after the 
mid-1990s, Athens tried to mend relations 
with neighbours. During the Kosovo war, 
Greece did not participate in, but offered 
crucial facilitations to NATO operations, 
and participated in the Operation Allied 
Harbour that managed the influx of refu-
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gees. The Simitis government followed a 
difficult middle way between the strong 
anti-intervention sentiment of the vast 
majority (97 percent) of the public opin-
ion, the opposition and the media, and the 
obligations towards its NATO allies and the 
regional stability.
After the Kosovo war, Greece fully sub-
scribed to the vision of integrating the 
Balkans into the EU and NATO. It was at 
the Thessaloniki Summit, during Greece’s 
2003 European Council Presidency, that the 
Balkan countries’ accession aspirations got 
the greatest push. Greece also helped Bul-
garia and Romania join the EU. But failed 
attempts to resolve the name issue and, 
more recently, moves by the Gruevski gov-
ernment in Skopje which were understood 
as provocations in Athens pushed Greece to 
block both FYROM’s entry to NATO and its 
start of EU accession negotiations. 
When Kosovo declared independence 
Greece decided not to recognize, explain-
ing its position with reference to the respect 
for international law, the territorial integ-
rity of states as well as regional stability. 
The concern that Kosovo would also set 
a precedent for Cyprus was also in Greek 
policy makers’ minds, even if this dimen-
sion was not explicitly mentioned. Instead, 
Athens declared that it would support any 
status for Kosovo that would result from a 
mutual and negotiated agreement between 
Belgrade and Pristina. Importantly, Greek 
officials have not ruled out the recognition 
of Kosovo. Greece also formally aims to pro-
mote the integration of the entire Balkans, 
including Kosovo, into the Euro-Atlantic in-
stitutions. A reasonable assumption is that 
this cannot happen without Greece even-
tually recognizing Kosovo, which appears 
to contradict the thesis about the mutually 
agreed solution. This is an ambivalent and 
ambiguous position that may in the future 
produce friction within Greece’s foreign 
policy aims, especially if, contrary to EU 
expectations, Serbia does not eventually 
accept Kosovar statehood in order to join 
the bloc. 
There is very little public debate in the 
Greek media and public about Kosovo’s 
status. The few exceptions include debates 
organized by policy think tanks, usually at-
tended by specialized audiences, which are 
only occasionally picked up by mainstream 
media. During such debates, academics, 
former politicians and retired diplomats 
have sometimes questioned Greece’s pol-
icy and argued for recognition of Kosovo. 
But these views have not managed to gen-
erate greater public interest or a momentum 
for recognition within political circles. The 
Kosovo issue, as foreign policy in general, 
is simply not a priority for crisis-stricken 
Greece. That said, the Kosovo issue is often 
used by extreme nationalist politicians in 
their anti-Albanian and anti-Muslim rants. 
Despite non-recognition, Athens has made 
conscious efforts to engage with Kosovo, 
recognizing the new reality on the ground, 
and perhaps as a counter-balance for its 
one-sided policies in the 1990s. Greece 
maintains a Liaison Office in Pristina, led 
by an Ambassador, unlike any other of the 
EU non-recognisers. Numerous formal and 
informal meetings between top-level offi-
cials of Greece and Kosovo have taken place 
since 2008. Greece accepts Kosovar travel 
documents, and cars with Kosovar license 
plates can enter Greece. Athens also facil-
itated Kosovo’s membership in the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, 
and the European Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development either by voting in 
favour of Pristina’s application (in EBRD) 
or by making the quorum for the vote pos-
sible. In addition, Greece was the only EU 
non-recogniser that did not participate with 
written or oral statements during the delib-
erations for the case of Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence before the International 
Court of Justice. 
Moreover, Greek officials have over the 
years managed to achieve levels of visibil-
ity in Kosovo, unparalleled by any other 
non-recognising state. Ambassador Dimi-
tris Moschopoulos, while in charge of the 
Greek Liaison Office in Pristina, was also 
also the EU Facilitator for the Serbian Cul-
tural and Religious Heritage in Kosovo. In 
this capacity, he developed a working rela-
tionship with Kosovar governmental insti-
tutions unprecedented for a diplomat from 
a non-recognising country. Moschopoulos 
was instrumental in bringing to the nego-
tiating table the Kosovar government and 
the Serbian Orthodox Church, two institu-
tions that had not cooperated formally or 
informally. The current Head of the Liaison 
Office, Ambassador Konstantina Athanassi-
adou, is also a very active in Pristina, and, 
like her predecessor, frequently appears 
in Kosovar media and other public fora. In 
addition, another senior Greek diplomat, 
Ambassador Alexandra Papadopoulou, is 
serving as Head of the EULEX Mission since 
July 2016.
The Liaison Office itself has been very active 
in organizing the visits of business delega-
tions from Greece and generally promoting 
bilateral trade and investment. Economic 
connections between the two countries 
have strengthened in recent years, as have 
civil society and academic exchanges. 
Another key element of the policy of en-
gagement was an initial agreement for the 
opening of a Representation Office for Trade 
and Economic Affairs of Kosovo in Greece, 
which was reached during the Kosovar 
Foreign Minister Enver Hoxhaj’s visit to 
Athens, in March 2013. The agreement was 
criticized by the nationalist opposition in 
Greece, and progress in its implementation 
has been slow due to shifting priorities of 
the Kosovo government. 
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Greece’s policy of engagement with Kosovo 
continued under the SYRIZA-ANEL govern-
ment, even though both parties had previ-
ously held positions quite hostile towards 
Kosovo. While in office, MFA Nikos Kotzias 
picked up from where his predecessors had 
left off and continued to strengthen bilateral 
relations. During his visit to Kosovo in July 
2015 he signalled that Greece would support 
Kosovo’s applications to join Interpol and 
UNESCO. None such move, however, ma-
terialised, likely due to to reactions by the 
Greek opposition and the Serbian govern-
ment. While the policy of engagement has 
repeatedly met severe criticism by populist 
and nationalist political forces, members 
of key parties – such as New Democracy, 
PASOK and SYRIZA – also criticized the 
government of the day for allegedly overly 
promoting relations with Kosovo while they 
were in opposition. The Embassy of Serbia 
in Athens also issues regular protests on the 
policy, and there is criticism by Serbian of-
ficials in Belgrade.  
Overall, the Kosovo issue exposes a fissure 
between a realpolitik foreign policy of en-
gagement with Pristina, on one hand, and, 
on the other hand, a position akin to the 
one-sided and stereotypical views of the 
1990s, which questions or even fiercely 
opposes closer cooperation. The former 
position seems to be better understood by 
professional diplomats and some promi-
nent politicians and is fully cultivated by 
the government of the day. The latter posi-
tion is more emotional. It is championed by 
minor parties, which are fascinated by con-
spiracy theories and cultivate anti-Western 
sentiment; but it is also quite often popu-
lar among mainstream opposition parties 
on the look to score easy political points. 
What this situation reveals is that for Greek 
parties the easy fall back position is to re-
vert to foreign policy views formulated in 
the 1990s. In that context, it is the policy 
of engagement with Kosovo that generates 
criticism and seems as a weird policy choice 
to most, and not the non-recognition of 
Kosovo. 
Having not recognized Kosovo for almost 
a decade, it is difficult to imagine today a 
scenario in which Greece would recognize 
the new country ‘out of the blue’. Inertia 
will tend to keep Athens along the com-
fortable path of non-recognition and con-
tinuing strong engagement. It is after all 
a successful strategy, if not for ‘keeping 
everybody happy’, at least for not ‘making 
anyone unhappy’. For Greece to seriously 
consider changing its position something 
‘spectacular’ or ‘extraordinary’ would 
have to happen. This does not seem a like-
ly development for now. Instead, bilateral 
relations will have to continue being built 
‘the hard way’. Therefore, incremental 
improvement of relations between Greece 
and Kosovo are tremendously important if 
Kosovo is to maintain its hopes for eventu-
al recognition. Engagement should be con-
tinued and intensified, if necessary at the 
initiative and insistence of Kosovars. Im-
portantly, though, Kosovo’s insistence for 
full reciprocity, and for Kosovo to receive 
from Greece treatment reserved for recog-
nized states, can prove counter-productive. 
It satisfies Kosovo’s sense of self-esteem but 
plays directly into the hands of the Serbian 
diplomacy, always working to undermine 
Greece’s policy of engagement, since it al-
lows for the perception of Kosovars as un-
grateful and greedy. 
The tendency in recent years for policy co-
ordination between Kosovo and Albania is 
also seen with skepticism in Athens. Gener-
ally, Greece feels uncomfortable when the 
Albanian-inhabited areas coordinate and 
behave as one. While no-one can prevent 
or object to intensive cooperation in cultur-
al and low-politics issues, signals that high 
politics follow the same path are perceived 
by Greece as a dangerous development to be 
prevented or delayed. They naturally fur-
ther strengthen the anti-recognition voices. 
Likewise, the anti-recognition stance will 
gain greater support in Greece if Kosovar 
officials and opinion makers appear to sup-
port Albania on issues that are highly sensi-
tive to Greece. Athens and Tirana have sev-
eral bilateral disputes that make relations 
extremely complicated; even if, at the same 
time, they share too many things to allow 
their bilateral relations to turn sour. Kosovo 
can only lose if they uncritically support, 
for example, Cham activists’ agenda against 
Greece or if they adopt a discourse of vic-
timhood of the entire Albanian nation by 
its neighbours. 
Lastly, the calls in recent years for unifica-
tion between Albania and Kosovo can only 
make things more difficult for Pristina. 
Such calls strengthen those in Greece who 
are totally against any prospect of recog-
nition and will harden their resolve. They 
also frustrate the efforts of those who are 
– reluctantly or not – ready to contemplate 
a change of policy. Why would someone ac-
cept the independence of a country if that 
very country were ready to subsequently 
forego its independence to join another 
state?
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What is misunderstood in Kosovo is to what extend was Slovak non-recognition driven by do-
mestic concerns and historical legacies rath-
er than geopolitics. By the time Kosovo de-
clared independence, Slovakia was already a 
self-confident member of the EU and NATO, 
which was aligned on major issues with its 
main allies. Using the fact that recognition 
of states is a national prerogative, and that 
they are some other EU and NATO members 
with similar concerns, Bratislava decided 
in 2007-2008 to defined its own position 
on Kosovo against the prevailing Western 
consensus. It has also managed to stick to it 
ever since, while becoming gradually more 
pragmatic in its European policy and bilat-
eral relations with Prishtina.
Slovakia became an independent coun-
try in the early 1990s, through a peaceful 
separation from the Czech Republic. The 
break-up of Czechoslovakia was a result of 
political deal between newly elected leaders 
in Prague and Bratislava in 1992. In the ab-
sence of territorial disputes, ethnic issues or 
history of conflicts between both successor 
states, constitutionally driven separation 
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was possible. In the words of former Czech 
Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg, 
it was a proof that there is such thing as a 
‘happy divorce’. In some history books, the 
swift and orderly break-up of Czechoslovak 
federation is depicted as a contrasting case 
to the simultaneous violent and chaotic 
break-up of Yugoslavia, which ended up in 
series of terrible wars of secession (with Ser-
bia as dominant ‘federal power’) stretched 
over a decade. One characteristic feature of 
Slovak views is reluctance to acknowledge 
that there was simply no scope for political 
agreement between Serbia on Kosovo after 
the 1999 war, and new settlement had to be 
imposed from outside. 
A second determinant in the Slovak per-
spective is a deeper historical sensitivity 
to issues of borders and secession of ethnic 
minorities. This goes all the way back to the 
break-up of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 
in 1918-1920 period, when Slovakia for the 
first time emerged on a map with territory 
that included ethnic Hungarian regions in 
the south of the country. During the World 
War II, Hitler’s Nazi Germany rewarded its 
ally Hungary with restoration of old borders, 
which was annulled by peace settlement af-
ter 1945. Even though four decades of com-
munism stabilized the border of southern 
Slovakia on the Danube River, the old sen-
sitivities were back in the 1990s, fuelled by 
political parties in Budapest demanding re-
unification of Hungarians in the Carpathian 
Basin across the borders. This deep uncer-
tainty about borders and ethnic minorities 
was one of the driving factors of Slovak di-
plomacy a keen interest in developments in 
the Western Balkans in the 1990s. Several 
Slovak officials have played a prominent role 
in the region’s affairs over the past twenty 
years. Most notably, Miroslav Lajčák, a Slo-
vak diplomat who went on to become min-
ister of foreign affairs, served as the EU’s 
Special Envoy overseeing Montenegro’s 
independence referendum, in 2006, and as 
the High Representative to Bosnia and Her-
zegovina (2007-2009). 
The third element in Slovakia’s approach to 
Kosovo was historical friendship with Serbia 
going back to the 19th century. Apart from 
the general sense of Slavic solidarity, they 
were also shaped by the fact that there is a 
small, but appreciable, Slovak community 
in the northern Serbian province of Vojvo-
dina.  
Almost from the outset, Kosovo has been 
a contentious issue in Slovak politics. The 
1999 NATO campaign against Serbia was ex-
tremely unpopular in the country. However, 
the Slovak government of the time, under 
the centre-right Prime Minister Mikuláš 
Dzurinda, nevertheless decided to support 
the military strikes and opened to country’s 
airspace to NATO as the country was at the 
time waiting for the final approval of its 
NATO membership. Following the end of 
hostilities, Slovakia decided to contribute 
troops to the NATO mission established to 
keep the peace in Kosovo (KFOR). This con-
tribution reached a maximum of 140, before 
the troops were eventually withdrawn in 
2010. It also contributed personnel to the UN 
mission in Kosovo, which was established to 
oversee the political development on Koso-
vo and prepare it for a final status process. 
(In 2006, 42 Slovaks military personnel and 
civilians lost their lives in Han air accident 
over Hungary as they were returning from 
Kosovo.) Importantly, in the mid-2000s, 
Slovak Foreign Ministry established a liai-
son office in Pristina, and kept it there ever 
since.
In January 2006, the UN began a process to 
determine the final status of Kosovo. As it 
became clear that the talks would not end 
in an agreed solution between the Kosovo 
provisional institutions of self-government 
and the Serbian government, preparation 
began for a unilateral Declaration of Inde-
pendence. Initially positive approach of 
Slovak diplomacy to Kosovo’s aspirations 
was blocked by domestic politics. Heated 
dispute in the Slovak parliament over the so-
called Ahtisaari Plan was tuned into a bi-par-
tisan resolution in 2007. It had a non-bind-
ing status, but passed with a overwhelming 
majority of all Slovak political parties (with 
the ethnic Hungarian party being the only 
one against), it determined Slovak non-rec-
ognition a year later. When, in February 
2008, Kosovo declared independence, the 
Slovak government, along the lines of the 
parliamentary resolution, announced that 
it would not recognise it as an independent 
and sovereign state, and repeatedly insisted 
that the eventual outcome should be mu-
tually agreed by the authorities in Belgrade 
and Prishtina. Later that year, Bratislava also 
voted in favour of a UN General Assembly 
resolution put forward by Serbia that passed 
the question of the unilateral Declaration of 
Independence to the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ). When the case came before 
the ICJ, Slovakia presented a written sub-
mission. Following the Court’s opinion, 
released in July 2010, Bratislava made it 
clear that it would not change its stance on 
recognition. 
Although Slovakia did not recognise Koso-
vo, it emerged as one of the three non-rec-
ognisers that was willing to engage with 
Pristina. Slovakia maintained a liaison of-
fice in Pristina even after the Declaration 
of Independence. Also, there have been 
regular contacts between Slovak officials 
and senior Kosovo officials, even though 
such activities have tended to be kept out 
of the public spotlight, and have received 
little media attention. These efforts were 
led by Miroslav Lajcak, who was now for-
eign minister. This process of engagement 
was made easier by the EU-led process of 
normalisation between Belgrade and Pris-
tina. As Serbia became ever more relaxed 
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about engaging with the Kosovo authori-
ties, Slovakia also gradually increased its 
own position on Kosovo. For example, in 
July 2012, without much fanfare and pub-
lic announcement, the Slovak government 
decided that it would recognise Kosovo 
passports. Later that year, Kosovo foreign 
foreign minister, Enver Hoxhaj even visit-
ed Bratislava to speak at a prominent think 
tank, and held an unofficial meeting with 
Lajcak. The following year, a group of nine 
Slovak parliamentarians, from various par-
ties, visited Kosovo. 
By 2013, Slovakia seemed to have become so 
engaged with Pristina that it even appeared 
to some outside observers as though it may 
be preparing to recognise Kosovo. Spec-
ulation grew that this could be done as a 
joint initiative in conjunction with Greece 
or Romania, or possible both. This sense 
that recognition may be forthcoming was 
also fuelled by the March 2014 presidential 
election. The main independent candidate, 
Andrej Kiska, went on record as saying that 
Slovakia should recognise Kosovo - a po-
sition that was repeatedly attacked by his 
main challenger, Prime Minister Robert Fico 
as ‘irresponsible’. Fico lost this election but 
remained head of government and leader 
of the ruling party.  In fact, this high-pro-
file episode had the opposite effect: foreign 
minister Lajcak was reminded that his own 
flexible approach on Kosovo is not consis-
tent with the rigid line of his prime minister, 
and newly elected President Kiska was re-
luctant to confrontation Fico’s government 
over a sensitive foreign policy issue which 
was not even in his competence (recognition 
of states). 
In parallel, this setback in Bratislava was re-
inforced by major external events. Russia’s 
invasion and subsequent annexation of 
Crimea, also in March 2014, brought issues 
of secession and territorial integrity back to 
the forefront of foreign policy discussions 
in Europe and beyond.  IN Slovakia, this was 
further proof of the need for the internation-
al community to respect international law 
and territorial integrity of Ukraine. There 
appeared to be strong cross-party consen-
sus not to touch the Kosovo non-recogni-
tion, which from the Slovak perspective 
was consistent with position against illegal 
secession of Crimea. According to the Slovak 
constitution, recognition of states is a com-
petence of the executive branch. However, 
any Slovak government that wants to rec-
ognise Kosovo, will be expected to formally 
initiate a new resolution in the parliament 
and get a majority vote. None of the four 
successive governments since 2007 had 
enough guts, interest or reasons to risk it. 
Nevertheless, some prominent political 
voices have suggested that Slovakia should 
accept Kosovo’s statehood. For instance, the 
Chairman of the Slovak Parliament’s Foreign 
Relations Committee, František Šebej, rep-
resenting a civic Slovak-Hungarian party, 
argued that Bratislava should accept the 
reality of Kosovo’s independence. There was 
also a parliamentary hearing on the matter 
in 2015 organised by a local think tank. 
Although Slovakia has not recognised Koso-
vo, the past decade has shown that Bratisla-
va has been willing to engage with it. Slova-
kia maintains an official presence in Pristina 
and there have been frequent political con-
tacts between Kosovo and Slovak officials. 
This creates ground for further engagement 
between the two. One option that has been 
suggested is the opening of a Kosovo trade 
or liaison office in Bratislava. Slovak and 
Kosovar diplomats were discreetly talking 
about technical and legal modalities in 
2013-2014 period but the whole initiative 
was then put on hold. Bratislava signalled 
to Pristhina that is prepare to move ahead 
once similar office in Greece is opened, 
which has never materialised. Window of 
opportunity could have been wasted. This 
is important as it would allow Kosovo to es-
tablish its own presence in the Slovak capital 
and thus speak directly to Slovak politicians 
and the Slovak people. Meanwhile, a sense 
of pragmatism appears to continue. Slovakia 
supported the signing of the 2015 Stabilisa-
tion and Association Agreement between 
the EU and Kosovo. However, the Slovak 
government has also been careful not to 
antagonise Serbia. For example, in Novem-
ber 2015, Slovakia voted against admitting 
Kosovo to the UNESCO, even though Roma-
nia and Greece merely abstained. Lajcak lat-
er suggested that it had done this so as not to 
undermine the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue 
process. Also, Slovakia enjoys much greater 
trade relations with Serbia. 
While the eventual end goal for Kosovo will 
undoubtedly be recognition, this should 
not be the only focus at this stage. Kosovar 
Foreign Ministry needs to have a clear plan 
with tangible results. It appears that there 
has been little initiative in the past year, and 
momentum has been lost. It is also import-
ant that civil society can play an important 
part. For example, the Kosovo Minister for 
European Integration, and a delegation 
of Kosovo civil society activists, visited 
Bratislava in September 2016 with the sup-
port of Kosovo Foundation for Open Soci-
ety (KFOS). However, finally, in the context 
of broader changes in the EU and transat-
lantic relations, it is important to realised 
that pressure for recognition from the US, 
Germany and the UK in bilateral talks has 
weakened or fizzled out. As things stand 
now, there is little indication that it is going 
to change its position on recognition for the 
foreseeable future. In the meantime, a lot of 
work can be done to improve relations and 
prepare the ground for when recognition 
does become a realistic prospect.
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As a European Union member state bordering non-EU countries to its north, east and south-west, Ro-
mania is interested in the European and 
Euro-Atlantic integration of the Western 
Balkans, a process that would boost its 
own security. Over the years, Bucharest 
has invested in the stability of the region. 
Romania has participated in most of the in-
ternational peacekeeping and peacebuild-
ing missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (fYROM), and Kosovo.
Romania traditionally has had good re-
lations with neighbouring Serbia. Roma-
nians also tend to have a positive opinion 
of Serbia due to the historically good ties 
between the two nations, at least compared 
to Romania’s relations with its other neigh-
bours. However, relations between the two 
countries are not without difficulties. On 28 
February 2012, Romania held up an agree-
ment on awarding Serbia EU candidate 
status in the EU General Affairs Council for 
several hours, asking Belgrade to do more 
to improve and protect the rights of the 
Romanian/Vlach minority in Serbia. Bel-
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grade’s close relations with Moscow also 
raise eyebrows in Bucharest.
Kosovo did not figure largely in Romanian 
internal debates before the start of the war 
(1998-1999). In October 1998, Romania 
granted limited overflight rights to NATO 
aircraft for emergency and unforeseen sit-
uations – even though this was opposed 
by the opposition Social Democratic Par-
ty, the biggest party at that time, and the 
nationalist Greater Romania Party, both of 
which were critical of the Western inter-
vention in Kosovo. On 30 March 1999, the 
parliament adopted a declaration calling 
for a solution to the conflict which would 
guarantee an end to the violence against 
the civilian population, especially vio-
lence against the citizens of Albanian mi-
nority in Kosovo; respect for the rights of 
the citizens belonging to a minority in the 
Yugoslav space; the return of the displaced 
populations; and the territorial integrity 
and sovereignty of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. The 
Romanian government approved the unre-
stricted use of Romanian airspace for NATO 
operations against Serbia in April 1999, but 
at the same time continued to support the 
territorial integrity of Serbia.
The Romanian government refused to rec-
ognise Kosovo’s declaration of indepen-
dence, in February 2008. In fact, it was 
rejected by the entire Romanian political 
class, apart from the Democratic Union of 
Hungarians in Romania (UDMR), the main 
political organisation representing the eth-
nic Hungarians of Romania, which calls 
for the territorial autonomy of the Széke-
ly Land, an ethnographic area situated in 
Eastern Transylvania. The Parliament ad-
opted a declaration stating that the “con-
ditions to recognise the new entity are not 
fulfilled”, and that “the decision in Pristi-
na and the potential recognition by other 
states of the unilaterally declared indepen-
dence cannot be interpreted as a precedent 
for other areas”. Rejecting the recognition 
of collective rights for national minorities, 
the Romanian authorities maintained that 
Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of indepen-
dence was contrary to international law 
and that it set a dangerous precedent that 
could be used by other separatist move-
ments, such as the pro-Russian separatists 
from Transnistria. 
Although the initial rejection of Kosovo’s 
independence seems to have been moti-
vated mainly by legal reasons, and is seen 
in Romania as a principled position, other 
factors also played a part, such as oppo-
sition to separatist movements. Also, the 
desire not to give the Romanian Hungari-
an leaders additional arguments to use in 
their push for regional autonomy played 
a part. The Romanian president rejected 
comparisons between the situation of the 
Albanians in Kosovo and the Hungarian mi-
nority in Romania, arguing that, unlike in 
Kosovo, minorities enjoy political, cultural 
and education rights in Romania. The his-
torically good relations with neighbouring 
Serbia also played a role. While there is no 
real enmity between Romania and Kosovo, 
many Romanian experts are critical of the 
process through which Kosovo declared its 
independence, and believe that the region 
did not prove to be economically self-sus-
tainable. Moreover, diplomatic pressure 
from its European partners, such as the 
UK, to recognise Kosovo’s independence, 
or allow Kosovo to be admitted into global 
or regional organisations, has not been well 
received.
Following improvements in relations be-
tween Belgrade and Pristina, the Romanian 
president and the government eased their 
opposition to engagement with Kosovo. 
While in May 2011 the Romanian president 
cancelled his participation to a Warsaw 
meeting of heads of state and government 
from Central Eastern Europe with US 
President Barack Obama because of the 
presence of the president of Kosovo at the 
meeting, in the following years, Romania 
organised several multilateral meetings in 
which Kosovo took part, including at the 
highest level. Kosovo joined the South-
East European Cooperation Process at its 
summit held in Bucharest on June 2014, 
during the Romanian chairmanship-in-of-
fice, a development made possible by the 
non-institutionalized character of this 
regional cooperation format, by Serbia’s 
agreement and the maintenance of the as-
terisk accompanying Kosovo’s designation. 
Moreover, during Kosovo’s 2015 unsuccess-
ful bid to join UNESCO, Romania abstained 
from voting, together with another EU 
non-recognizer, Greece, and Poland, which 
had recognized Kosovo. (The other three 
EU non-recognizers, Cyprus, Spain and 
Slovakia, voted against the bid.) Romania, 
together with the other non-recognizers, 
also permitted the signing of the October 
2015 Stabilisation and Association Agree-
ment between the EU and Kosovo. For Ro-
mania, the agreement does not change its 
position on Kosovo’s independence and 
does not constitute recognition.
At one stage, a conflict between former 
President Băsescu and Prime Minister 
Ponta appeared to raise the prospect that 
Romania’s position regarding Kosovo’s in-
dependence could change. While the pres-
ident opposed the recognition of Kosovo’s 
independence, though less strongly than 
in 2008, the Prime Minister made several 
declarations in 2013 in favour of recognis-
ing Kosovo, suggesting this could happen 
when Băsescu’s second and last mandate 
ended, in December 2014. However, the 
Prime Minister’s change of position seemed 
to have had more to do with his wish to 
score political points against the then presi-
dent and to improve his political image vis-
44
LACK OF ENGAGEMENT? SURVEYING THE SPECTRUM OF EU MEMBER STATE POLICIES TOWARDS KOSOVO
45
à-vis Romania’s Western allies than any se-
rious internal reconsideration of Romania’s 
position. Romania was unlikely to change 
its position without a good reason for do-
ing so; even if Ponta had won the Novem-
ber 2014 presidential elections, which he 
did not. The current Romanian president, 
Klaus Iohannis, has maintained the same 
stance as his predecessor and there are no 
indications that this will change soon. 
Despite its continuing policy not to rec-
ognise Kosovo, Romania has been prag-
matic and has worked with the other EU 
member states on practical issues related 
to Kosovo’s development and EU integra-
tion. Romania has been one of the main 
contributors to the international missions 
in Kosovo, such as UNMIK, EULEX and 
KFOR, and Bucharest has maintained its 
contingent of gendarmes in Kosovo after 
the region declared independence. In Sep-
tember 2011, frustrated with the refusal of 
some of the big EU member states to accept 
Romania into the Schengen Area, Bucha-
rest decided to withdraw its policemen and 
gendarmes from EULEX. Nevertheless, it 
has continued to participate in the NATO 
KFOR mission, with around 50-60 Roma-
nian servicemen in 2016-2017. Romania 
also allows Kosovo residents to travel to 
Romania, issues visas, and keeps separate 
records regarding trade with Kosovo. Ro-
mania has a Liaison office accredited to the 
UN mission. People-to-people exchanges 
and visits also happen, despite the lack of 
diplomatic relations. For example, in April 
2015 the Kosovo Foundation for Open So-
ciety and the British Council in Kosovo 
organised a visit to Kosovo of a Romanian 
delegation of journalists and analysts and 
several sports matches between Kosovar 
and Romanian teams took place since 2008. 
Looking ahead, there is little reason to sug-
gest that Romania will change its stance 
on recognition. The proliferation of sep-
aratist movements in the Black Sea area, 
including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the 
annexation of Crimea by Russia, and the 
war in Eastern Ukraine have further com-
plicated the situation and given Bucharest 
further reasons for caution. These events 
have also led to a decrease in the external 
pressure on Romania to recognise Koso-
vo’s independence. Moreover, a new push 
of Romania’s Hungarian minority for more 
autonomy for Székely Land, and public 
pressure from Hungary in this direction, is 
further driving Bucharest to maintain its 
position. Most recently, the 2017 indepen-
dence referendums in Catalonia and Iraqi 
Kurdistan have given Bucharest yet more 
reasons to be careful. Bucharest has sup-
ported Spain’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity in strong terms, rejecting territo-
rial changes made without the agreement 
of the state involved. As there is no indi-
cation that the other four non-recognisers 
are ready to move towards recognition, any 
change in Romania’s position would there-
fore stand out. This makes any change even 
less probable. As the reasons that made the 
other four EU member states reject Koso-
vo’s independence have not disappeared 
– on the contrary, in cases such as Spain 
they have become much more acute – it is 
hard to expect either a coordinated move 
towards recognising Kosovo, or a unilateral 
change by Bucharest. A change in position 
would require a more favourable interna-
tional climate as Romania would bear costs 
that Bucharest is currently not willing to in-
cur. It does not want to give the impression 
that the principle of territorial integrity of 
countries has been weakened, nor explain 
this change of position domestically. For 
the moment, Romania is therefore likely 
to continue to follow the development of 
relations between Belgrade and Pristina 
and adapt its position accordingly.
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Because of the consequences of the Turkish invasion and occupation of the northern third of the island, as 
well as the ongoing intractability of the Cy-
prus problem (or ‘national problem’ as it is 
referred to in Greek), the Cyprus government 
has always positioned itself against the rec-
ognition of Kosovo statehood. The continu-
ing stalemate has meant that there is a strong 
‘values’ component to Cypriot foreign policy, 
which is foremost based on international law 
and the respect of human rights, the so-called 
‘position of principles’. In that context, Nic-
osia has consistently insisted that the final 
status of Kosovo must be reached within 
the framework of dialogue and negotiations 
between Pristina and Belgrade, and that the 
UN Security Council must approve the settle-
ment. Accordingly, Nicosia closely observes 
that the full adherence to the international le-
gal framework of the UN Security Council Res-
olution 1244 (1999) and the relevant Council 
Conclusions guide EU policy towards Kosovo. 
It is in this framework that Nicosia has sup-
ported the deployment of UN missions and 
other regional organisations there, as well 
as the channelling of EU humanitarian aid to 
Kosovo. 
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Likewise, in 2009, the Cyprus government sub-
mitted a written statement to the Internation-
al Court of Justice (ICJ) with its views on the 
Kosovo situation. It argued that the Kosovo in-
stitutions did not have the legal competence to 
declare independence and therefore the decla-
ration was inconsistent with international law; 
Kosovo’s rights remained those established by 
UNSC Resolution 1244(1999) and the processes 
it prescribes (paragraphs 192 and 193). Nicosia 
has also taken a hard-line position on EU visa 
liberalisation for Kosovo by strongly opposing 
the recognition of Kosovo travel documents, 
just as it opposes the recognition of ‘Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) pass-
ports. Nevertheless, Kosovars can enter the Re-
public of Cyprus with a multiple entry Schen-
gen visa. Also, in 2015, Nicosia voted against 
Pristina’s proposal for UNESCO membership 
on the same grounds.
Another factor that has shaped the Cypriot 
position is the nature of its bilateral ties with 
the Western Balkan countries. From the ear-
ly stages of the conflict in Yugoslavia, in 1991, 
until the ultimate breakup of the Federal Re-
public of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 2006, Nicosia was 
a committed supporter of the Serbian cause; 
notwithstanding its official adherence to UN 
imposed sanctions. At the grassroots level, 
most Greek-Cypriots empathise with Serbs. 
They consider them victims of secessionism 
comparing the unilateral declaration of in-
dependence of Kosovo to that of the ‘TRNC’. 
They also relate to Serbia through cultural and 
religious lenses of the Christian Orthodox faith. 
Moreover, Serbia is the only Western Balkan 
country that has noteworthy relations with 
Cyprus in terms of trade and tourism. At the 
political level, Belgrade is the only capital in 
the region where Cyprus has opened an Em-
bassy, and the two countries maintain regular 
relations. However, it is also important to note 
that as long as EU positions do not compromise 
the ‘national problem’, Nicosia has also shown 
that it can position itself politically in ways 
that may have seemed unlikely. For example, 
in 1998 and 2000, Cyprus implemented an oil 
and arms embargo, bans on flights and officials, 
and financial sanctions on the FRY.
Despite its opposition to Kosovo’s unilateral 
declaration of independence, and its strong 
ties to Serbia, Nicosia’s discourse on non-rec-
ognition has evolved somewhat over the past 
decade. In 2008, the then Foreign Minister 
Markos Kyprianou underlined the Cypriot 
‘position of principles’. Nicosia went as far as 
to say that it would not recognise Kosovo even 
if Serbia does. Today, Nicosia realises that Cy-
prus cannot be more Serbian than Serbia, ac-
knowledging that if Serbia recognises Kosovo, 
the Cyprus government is likely to follow suit. 
Another factor that has influenced Nicosia’s 
ability, or willingness, to engage with the Koso-
vo authorities is its so-called ‘European consen-
sus’ policy. Although Cyprus remains staunchly 
opposed to recognising Kosovo’s statehood, the 
Cyprus government is committed to acting as 
a constructive EU member state that works to-
wards a consensus on EU policies. It does not 
want to stand out as the only member state to 
oppose an EU decision. One such example was 
Nicosia’s handling of the deployment of EU’s 
Rule of Law mission in Kosovo (EULEX). While 
initially the Cyprus government had refused to 
approve the deployment of the CSDP mission, 
when it found itself isolated from the rest of the 
member states – even from those that opposed 
independence – it conceded to it (but through 
abstention on the vote). Cyprus remains the 
only non-recogniser that does not contribute 
to the mission, although it takes part in all EU 
meetings and decisions that concern this mis-
sion and approves its budget. (Cyprus has also 
contributed to the EU police missions in Bos-
nia-Herzegovina and the former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia (fYROM).) Also, Cyprus has 
clearly positioned itself in favour of a European 
future for the region. Its six-month presidency 
of the EU, in 2012, was a key moment to demon-
strate this commitment and to do away with the 
perception that Cyprus foreign policy is ‘single 
issue’-based, that is, defined solely in terms of its 
‘national problem’. However, it was also notice-
able that while Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou 
Markoulli travelled to Serbia, Montenegro, Bos-
nia and Herzegovina, and fYROM, and received 
Albanian and Serbian delegations in Nicosia, 
Kosovo was not included in the round of visits. 
Following his election, in February 2013, cen-
tre-right and pro-Western President Nicos 
Anastasiades set as his goal to join NATO’s 
Partnership for Peace programme and has 
strengthened relations with the United States. 
That along with the April 2013 Brussels agree-
ment between Belgrade and Pristina, which 
created the context for the ‘normalisation’ of 
relations between Kosovo and Serbia, provided 
Nicosia with grounds to soften its own position 
on normalisation of relations with Pristina. It 
explains why, in September 2013, Cyprus For-
eign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides met Kosovo 
Prime Minister Hashim Thaci on the margins of 
the UN General Assembly in New York. At that 
time, there were also discussions of Kasoulides 
visiting Pristina and the possible opening of li-
aison offices in Nicosia and Pristina, none of 
which materialised. 
Arguably, the 2010 ICJ advisory opinion on the 
legality of Kosovo’s declaration of indepen-
dence that established a clear differentiation 
between the Cyprus and Kosovo cases, has also 
acted as an unblocking mechanism for possi-
ble engagement between Nicosia and Pristina. 
However, the ICJ decision was not instrumen-
talised in any considerable manner because the 
popular perception of a possible precedent set 
by the recognition of Kosovo, which was salut-
ed by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. It is also 
worth noting that the positive climate between 
Nicosia and Pristina in 2013 developed in the 
background of a possible recognition by Ath-
ens of Kosovo. Overall, however, there is an un-
derstanding that on the Kosovo issue, Cyprus 
holds a clear ‘principled position’ regardless of 
a more lenient positioning in Greece.
More recently, there has been a reversal of 
pro-European trends. Since the emergence 
of tensions between Russia and the West, the 
smaller political parties that had become more 
open towards better relations with NATO, have 
now reverted to a far more pro-Russian posi-
tion. This is in addition to the left-wing party 
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AKEL (Progressive Party of Working People of 
Cyprus), the second biggest party in the Cyprus 
Parliament, which has close relations with Rus-
sia. This move is largely shaped by their per-
ception that Russia will protect Cyprus from 
wider international pressure on the ‘national 
problem’. This support for Moscow may also 
partly explain the distancing of Cyprus from 
the EU on specific issues, such as Kosovo. 
Moreover, the lack of substantive progress 
on the Belgrade-Pristina talks has created the 
impression that there is no real political com-
mitment to a negotiated solution to Kosovo’s 
‘status question’. 
Cooperation between the civil societies of Koso-
vo and Cyprus is limited. Seminars to exchange 
lessons and experiences among NGOs from the 
Western Balkan region, including from Kosovo, 
on the challenges facing divided societies, have 
taken place in Nicosia. A civil society network 
was created and a process of developing alter-
native historical narratives in the Western Bal-
kans is in progress. Moreover, Cypriot journal-
ists have visited Kosovo and reported on their 
experience in the media. Likewise, following 
Kosovo’s admission as a FIFA member in May 
2016, Cyprus and Kosovo played against each 
other in Nicosia, in January 2017. 
In recent months, the EU has increasingly fo-
cused its work on enlargement to the Western 
Balkans. European Commission Hahn’s latest 
statements on EU enlargement to the region 
have also indicated openings for the future. 
He declared that the chances of the Western 
Balkan region, including Kosovo, were better 
today than a year and a half ago, but pointed 
out that the process of getting closer to the EU 
meant implementation of reforms. This re-
newed attention on EU accession, in combina-
tion with the Cyprus government’s approach of 
‘European consensus’, could provide Nicosia 
with the necessary incentive for re-engaging 
in de facto relations with Pristina. One way of 
gaining traction for engagement from Nicosia 
on Kosovo is to commit more clearly and con-
cretely to the Belgrade-Pristina dialogue and 
implement what was already agreed. However, 
the continuing absence of resolve from other 
EU member states that are non-recognisers 
to change their position (most notably Spain), 
the ongoing Catalan crisis, and the latest break 
down in the bicommunal negotiations on the 
Cyprus problem, also provide Nicosia with 
sufficient reasons not to engage with Pristina. 
Overall, the notions of recognition and engage-
ment must be decoupled when looking at the 
position of the Cyprus government on Kosovo. 
Recognition of Kosovo will remain for Cyprus a 
question of negotiation between Pristina and 
Belgrade, and the settlement being approved 
by the UN Security Council. Engagement in de 
facto relations between Nicosia and Pristina, 
however, will be subject to identifying the right 
moment and making the most of a given oppor-
tunity. It will imply treading a fine line between 
Nicosia’s wish to safeguard its ‘position of prin-
ciples’, the positions of other non-recognisers, 
Nicosia’s efforts to avoid being isolated in the 
EU context, progress on the Pristina-Belgrade 
talks, and shifts in the EU discourse on, and 
actions in, the Western Balkans.
Traditionally, relations between Spain and Western Balkans have never been very close. For most of the 
twentieth century, the main link between 
them was the presence of Yugoslav Interna-
tional Brigadistas in the Spanish Civil War, 
or the timid approaches of some Spanish 
politicians to follow the Yugoslav model of 
non-alignment. However, since the start of 
the 1990s and the collapse of Yugoslavia, 
Spain has taken a stronger political inter-
est in the region; even if trade and other 
economic relations between Spain and the 
Western Balkans remains minimal. 
As a plurinational and diverse state, Spain 
has always defended the existence of 
countries with similar features. That also 
applied to Yugoslavia. In 1991, Francisco 
Fernández-Ordoñez, the then Spanish 
Foreign Affairs Minister, proposed to the 
Foreign Affairs Council to initiate a fast-
track recognition and enlargement pro-
cedure for Yugoslavia as the only way to 
stop the dissolution of the country. Despite 
this pre-emptive stance at the start of the 
breakup of Yugoslavia, Spain subsequently 
confined itself to adopting reactive posi-
tions with regards to developments in the 
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Balkans. This included firm opposition 
to secessionist movements in the region. 
More generally, it has tended to follow 
the path marked by the European Union 
and its partners in NATO. During the Bos-
nia war, Spain participated very actively 
in peacekeeping operations, especially 
in the Mostar region and in 1999, the Az-
nar governments joined the international 
alliance to bomb Serbia under the NATO 
umbrella, undertaken when Javier Sola-
na was Secretary General. This important 
presence on the field, together with the 
traditional sympathy many in the Balkans 
have towards Spain because of the civil 
War, and the impression that Spain is a 
neutral actor, meant that many saw Spain 
in positive terms. This in part explains the 
appointment of several Spaniards to high 
international positions in the Western Bal-
kans, notably the appointment of Carlos 
Westendorp as High Representative for 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and Felipe González 
as Personal Representative of the Chair-
man in Office for the FRY.
 In truth, despite the neutral way Spain 
has tended to be perceived in the region, 
Spanish foreign policy towards the Bal-
kans has generally been sympathetic to-
wards Serbia. This is largely because it 
was viewed as the core of Yugoslavia. This 
was demonstrated by successive Spanish 
ministers of foreign affairs, irrespective 
of their political affiliation. Probably the 
most active ministers have been Josep 
Pique (2000-2002) and Miguel Angel Mo-
ratinos (2004-2010). The former tried to 
stimulate trade and investment relations 
between Spain and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro at that 
time). The latter tried to reinforce the re-
gional dialogue and cooperation between 
Serbia and Kosovo. This explicit support 
towards Serbia has been seen in Spanish 
policy towards Kosovo issue, not least of 
all its immediate decision not to recognize 
Kosovo when it declared independence, in 
February 2008.
However, Spain’s opposition to Kosovo’s 
statehood is also shaped by two other fac-
tors. First, after the 2003 Iraq war, which 
Madrid supported, the Socialist govern-
ment of Spain (2004-2011) became a strong 
defender of international law. On this note, 
Spain contributed both written and oral 
statements to the International Court of 
Justice advisory opinion case on Kosovo’s 
declaration of independence. Secondly, 
and most importantly, Spain’s concerns 
over the Catalonia issue has had a crucial 
impact on its position. In 2009, the former 
Foreign Affairs Minister, José García Mar-
gallo, in comments to a Kosovar newspaper 
(Kosovo Times), stated that Spain did not 
recognize Kosovo because of “principles 
related to Spain’s Basque and Catalonia au-
tonomous communities, although the situ-
ation is not comparable”. However, he also 
added that Spain will support Kosovo’s de-
velopment even if it will not recognize it.
When the right-wing Popular Party as-
sumed office, in 2011, the prospects for 
recognition became even less likely. In 
2008, it was the first political party in Spain 
to speak out against Kosovo’s declaration 
of independence. This is a position that 
is not only favoured by the party’s elites, 
but is also supported by its followers, who 
are firmly against any process of indepen-
dence of any nature. This position is also 
supported by the right and central-right 
newspapers in the country, such as La 
Razón, ABC and El Mundo. On 14 March 
2012, the Spanish Prime Minister, Mariano 
Rajoy, told the nationalist Catalan MPs that 
the position of Spain towards Kosovo was 
not going to change. In doing so, he indi-
rectly invoked ‘internal factors’ to justify 
this stance, arguing that this decision was 
“the most convenient position for many 
Spanish people”. Internal concerns over 
secessionist movements, especially in 
Catalonia, have strengthened the govern-
ment’s position in recent years. As tensions 
have grown within Spain over Catalonia, so 
Spain’s position has hardened over Koso-
vo. As things stand, there will be no recog-
nition of any state declared independent 
unilaterally.
This is an important point to underline. 
The main problem Spain has with Koso-
vo is related to the ‘procedure’ by which 
it declared independence. Spain does not 
oppose the creation of new states. (It rec-
ognised Montenegro in 2006, and South 
Sudan, in 2011.) It is, however, opposed 
to unilateral acts of secession. This sensi-
tivity has become even more heightened 
after Catalan secessionists also unilaterally 
declared independence, in October 2017. 
Even if other EU members speak of a sui 
generis case, Spanish authorities worry 
about the precedent that Kosovo could set 
elsewhere in Europe. Spain was wholly op-
posed to the independence referendum in 
Crimea, and even expressed reservations 
about the referendum held in Scotland. 
Although they are totally different cases, 
Madrid’s argument was always the same, 
‘Spain is not Crimea, not Kosovo, not Scot-
land.’ Only a few people realized the differ-
ences between the cases.
Nevertheless, Spain supports engagement 
between Belgrade and Pristina. The agree-
ment between Serbia and Kosovo is seen in 
a very positive light. Madrid has also been 
proactive in helping to bring about these 
agreements through its diplomatic work in 
Belgrade. In this sense, Spain has used its 
privilege relationship with Serbia, which 
sees it as a loyal friend, to push forward the 
dialogue between the sides.  In addition, 
it should be noted that, until 2009, Spain 
was the sixth largest donor to UNMIK and 
KFOR until 2009. However, it refused to 
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participate in the missions leaded by NATO 
and in EULEX due to the fact they both 
contributed to build a new state. In 2009, 
Madrid announced the gradual withdrawal 
of all soldiers present in Kosovo.
In addition, private diplomatic initiatives 
have been launched with both Serbia and 
Kosovo. In the latter case, those contacts 
have been mainly through think tanks such 
as Real Instituto Elcano, Fundación CIDOB 
or European Council on Foreign Relations. 
They have invited academics or activists to 
take part in seminars focused on the situa-
tion in Kosovo. Those meetings, however, 
have not been made public. Participation 
was by invitation only. In such cases, it is 
also worth noting that the Kosovo partic-
ipants faced difficulties in entering the 
country as Spain does not recognize Koso-
vo passports. The only way to enter is with 
travel documents issued by the United 
Nations Interim Administration Mission 
in Kosovo to permanent inhabitants of 
Kosovo. (Even passports issued to citizens 
of the Republic of Kosovo, who reside in 
other Schengen member states that have 
recognized the Republic of Kosovo, are not 
recognized by Spain.)
Recognition of Kosovo by Spain is not go-
ing to happen any time soon. An attempt, 
in March 2017, by a Catalan secessionist po-
litical party to propose this was rejected 
in the Senate by the main political parties. 
While there are steps that could be taken 
that might help Madrid to engage with Pris-
tina, such as the successful institutional-
ization and reinforcement of rule of law in 
the country, the reality is that until terri-
torial tensions stopped in Spain, or there 
is a significant change in government, the 
chances of greater engagement, let alone 
recognition, are minimal.
After the declaration of indepen-dence on 17 February 2008, Koso-vo’s government embarked into 
a difficult task of obtaining international 
recognition and building institutions of 
the country. The process of international 
recognition of the state of Kosovo was seen 
by Kosovo authorities as an indispensable 
and crucial step for further strengthening 
of the international position of the Repub-
lic of Kosovo. Today, after almost ten years 
1  The issue of exact number of recognitions is rather ambiguous, with different sources citing different figures. While NFA uses the 
figure of 114, it is not clear whether Uganda and Nigeria have recognized Kosovo. Also, recently some media have announced that 
Suriname has withdrawn its recognition.
since the declaration of independence, 
the number of recognitions stands at 1141 
, with five European Union member states 
and two permanent members of the UN 
Security Council still refusing to recognize 
Kosovo. Official statement of Kosovo’s Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) regarding the 
international recognition of the indepen-
dence of Kosovo states that by achieving 
the overall number of 114 recognitions, the 
MFA has fulfilled the initial aim of obtain-
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ing more than 100 recognitions. According 
to the MFA, the merits for achievements so 
far belong to “the proactive and dynamic 
diplomacy of Kosovo,” as well as to the in-
ternational partners who lobbied for Koso-
vo’s recognition. However, it remains un-
clear which was the original time-frame for 
the initial aim of obtaining more than 100 
recognitions and whether overall efforts 
of Kosovo diplomacy in lobbying for rec-
ognition of Kosovo’s independence could 
be considered as successful. Most impor-
tantly, the question is whether there are 
any lessons learned regarding policies of 
(non)recognition in a current state of af-
fairs when securing more recognitions has 
become tremendously difficult, and when 
the five non-recognising EU member states 
still refuse to grant recognition?
Immediately after declaration of inde-
pendence, “continuous advancement of 
the international position of Kosovo and 
strengthening international support for 
recognition of Kosovo sovereignty” was 
emphasized as one of the most important 
Kosovo’s foreign policy strategic objectives. 
In line with this, “ensuring recognition of 
the state of Kosovo” was also seen as “a 
precondition for internal consolidation of 
Kosovo state.” Consequently, immediately 
after declaration of independence, Koso-
vo started the creation of its foreign policy 
institutions and diplomatic service that 
would fully engage in lobbying for recogni-
tion of country’s independence. As a result, 
on 3 April 2008, the Kosovo Government 
has established the MFA, while already in 
October 2008, Kosovo has started dispatch-
ing its first ten charge d’affaires, who would 
effectively work as Pristina’s ambassadors 
in some of the major recognizing countries. 
Initially, intensive lobbying for recognition 
has been heavily supported by Western in-
ternational partners, especially USA and 
UK. As a result, by the end of 2008, Kosovo 
received a total of 53 recognitions, includ-
ing 22 EU member states, and a number 
of important states such as USA, Canada, 
Norway, Switzerland, Australia and Turkey. 
However, already in 2009 the total number 
of recognitions dropped to only 11, though 
it is worth mentioning that among these 
recognitions were also the very important 
ones from Macedonia and Montenegro 
as neighbouring countries. In 2010 the 
number of recognitions declined further, 
totalling only 8, although the ruling of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) regard-
ing the 2008 unilateral declaration of in-
dependence of Kosovo was seen as rather 
favourable by all Kosovar political elites.
When the ruling of the ICJ did not yield the 
expected results and the number of new 
recognitions dropped significantly, the 
MFA has in 2011 drafted the “Strategy for 
Achieving Full International Recognition 
of the Republic of Kosovo.” Such Strategy 
was supposed to serve as a framework for 
achieving Kosovo’s strategic aim of interna-
tional acknowledgment by utilizing more 
diverse, in-depth and comprehensive tools. 
Practical implementation of the Strategy 
was meant to be closely coordinated with 
Kosovo’s strategic partners and in partner-
ship with other specific countries through-
out the world. Although the document was 
classified as confidential, interviews have 
revealed that the Strategy contained differ-
ent and complementary means of action for 
obtaining recognition. According to inter-
viewees, it represented a clear and profes-
sional orientation platform that included 
first-hand information as well as concise 
and feasible analysis and action plans for 
specific regions and states. Nevertheless, 
the interviewees believe that failure to fully 
implement the strategy was mainly due to 
the lack of inter-institutional coordination 
mechanisms that were foreseen as part of 
this strategy. Furthermore, they claim that 
the shift of lobbying mainly to political 
levels and the lack of proper coordination 
with the diplomatic network was a major 
obstacle to an effective diplomacy. Instead 
of coordinating and building state culture, 
recognition efforts were often personal-
ized and used by different state actors for 
internal political promotion, thus seriously 
weakening practical implementation of the 
strategy.
In addition to the straightforward strate-
gy for recognition, the Kosovo MFA has in 
2011 also launched an extensive multifac-
eted outreach campaign that for the first 
time employed means of public diplomacy 
in order to increase the overall interaction 
between Kosovo and the non-recognising 
countries and their public, especially the 
five non-recognising EU member states. 
Such aim was supposed to be achieved 
through establishment of channels of com-
munication between Kosovo’s civil soci-
ety, businesses, academia and media with 
counter-partners in the targeted countries. 
The first public diplomacy activities were 
part of the joint project between Kosovo 
MFA and British Government, implement-
ed by the British Council office in Kosovo 
that aimed to promote public diplomacy as 
an instrument of strengthening relations 
between the state of Kosovo and countries 
that have not yet recognized Kosovo. The 
project involved advocacy and informa-
tion activities to establish strong channels 
of communication with targeted countries 
by including eminent public personalities, 
civil society, media and genuine intellec-
tuals. Within public diplomacy activities 
several visits of parliamentarians, business 
representatives, civil society and media 
from Kosovo to the non-recognising EU 
member states were organised. With the 
aim of presenting and promoting Kosovo’s 
national interest to increase the number of 
recognitions, diverse and comprehensive 
groups of actors from the non-recognising 
EU member states have also visited Kosovo.
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Meanwhile, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
has prioritized the Digital Diplomacy as one 
of the key pillars of engagement and as a 
vital tool to support Kosovo recognition by 
providing truthful and positive informa-
tion from and about Kosovo. Accordingly, 
the Digital Diplomacy Strategy was drafted, 
and a plethora of activities were undertak-
en, mainly focusing on continued lobbying 
on recognition of Kosovo by the global inter-
net infrastructure, amendment of  content 
on major online sources of information, 
and boosting Kosovo narrative by pushing 
high-quality content to target audiences. 
The entire campaign represented quite a 
professional and innovative approach to 
digital diplomacy, while the strategy itself 
was awarded by the Turkish magazine Yeni 
Diplomasi as the fourth best in the world 
after United Kingdom, United States and 
Israel. Furthermore, DigitalKosovo.org was 
announced to be the best portal for digital 
engagement along the US State Department 
digital diplomacy website, while Kosovo’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Facebook page 
was listed as the most successful page in 
engaging online audiences.
Nevertheless, despite these activities, in 
the years to follow the number of recog-
nitions remained relatively low, with 13 
recognitions in 2011 and 2012 respectively, 
7 recognitions in 2014 and only one recog-
nition in 2015. In 2016 Kosovo managed to 
obtain two recognitions, while so far the 
number of recognitions in 2017 is only one. 
According to a high official of the British 
Council, the conducted public diplomacy 
activities have managed to to fill the gap 
in the knowledge base that non-recogniz-
ing countries in general have about con-
temporary Kosovo, while at the same time 
building initial bridges between Kosovo 
and the five non-recognising EU member 
states. However, once such activities were 
completed, neither there was a clear plan 
for specific course of action, nor were any 
follow-up activities undertaken. In a cur-
rent situation when gaining further recog-
nitions has become very difficult, there is 
a need for a well-thought and coordinated 
action by all foreign policy actors in Koso-
vo. Similarly, a former Kosovo diplomat 
maintains that previous foreign ministers 
have politicized the diplomatic service by 
appointing party militants, while at the 
same time ignoring meritocracy within the 
service, both in terms of appointments and 
promotions.
After several months of an institutional cri-
sis, Kosovo has on 9 September managed 
to form a new coalitional government. In 
addition of having two new political par-
ties on board, the current government has 
also a new Prime-minister and Minister of 
Foreign Affairs. Soon after being inaugu-
rated, the activities of the new government 
were greatly hindered by Kosovo’s local 
elections scheduled for October. Conse-
quently, since taking the office, the new 
government has hardly mentioned new 
recognitions, let alone initiated prepara-
tion of any recognition lobbying strategy, 
although the international partners have 
for years pushed the Kosovo governments 
to produce a comprehensive and feasible 
strategy to secure further recognitions. 
The actual situation is rather critical when 
it comes to further recognitions of Kosovo’s 
independence. Easy recognitions, mainly 
secured through intensive lobbying of key 
western partners are long gone. Internal 
situation is plagued with corruption, orga-
nized crime and nepotism, while appoint-
ment of Kosovo diplomats lacks meritoc-
racy, transparency and professionalism. 
Repetitive crises after almost every cycle 
of parliamentarian elections have serious-
ly damaged Kosovo’s image abroad. The 
country urgently needs an innovative and 
comprehensive plan related to further rec-
ognitions as well as an inter-institutional 
body to foster its full implementation. At 
the same time, this should be complement-
ed with a diverse and creative approach in 
public diplomacy that would increase com-
munication and intensify cooperation with 
governmental institutions and wider public 
of non-recognizing countries.
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